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In February 2013, the Francis Report outlined what it described as ‘systematic 
failings’ at Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust resulting in the death and 
suffering of many patients through neglect (in the UK context, hospitals can apply 
to gain foundation trust status. Foundation trust hospitals are part of the National 
Health Service (NHS) but are not directed by central government and have greater 
freedom to decide the way services are delivered. They adhere to core NHS prin-
ciples of free medical treatment based on need and not the ability to pay.) A lack of 
compassion, particularly among nursing staff, was identified as one of the contrib-
uting factors to poor care. The NHS was founded on the core value of compassion 
that today is one of six values all NHS staff are expected to demonstrate. Frequently 
invoked as a means to ensuring good patient care, it is a concept that is contested 
by a number of writers who argue that such moral emotions are not only unneces-
sary but dangerous. The purpose of this work is to explore the difference between 
compassion and care (but not medical treatment) in the context of the NHS. The 
paper draws on the work of Anca Gheaus, who argues there is a distinction to be 
made between the two and that while it is possible to be compassionate towards 
everybody, the ability to care, is limited to fewer people and is a more intense and 
engaged activity. Regarded as the founding myth of the NHS, the work also draws 
on the parable of the Good Samaritan to make the distinction between the two 
concepts more visible, and argues the roles played by the Good Samaritan and the 
innkeeper, remain relevant to the workings of today’s healthcare system. It also 
reflects on the need for kindness within the system.
Keywords: Care, compassion, Francis Report, Good Samaritan, NHS
1. Introduction
In February 2013, the Francis Report [1] outlined what it described as ‘systematic 
failings’ at Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust (foundation trusts are still part 
of the National Health Service (NHS) but are not directed by central government and 
have greater freedom to decide the way services are delivered.) [2] These systematic 
failings resulted in the death and suffering of many patients through neglect. In look-
ing to identify the causes of these failings, a lack of compassion particularly among 
nursing staff, was identified as one of the contributing factors. In his response to the 
Francis Report, the prime minister, David Cameron, recommended nurses ‘be hired 
and promoted on the basis of having compassion as a vocation’ and not just academic 
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qualification to ‘ensure that it plays a part in every healthcare interaction [3]. 
Cameron’s suggestion that nurses’ pay should be made dependent on their ability to 
demonstrate compassion in their jobs, gives rise to what Anne Bradshaw [4] describes 
as ‘a McDonald’s – type nursing care rather than heartfelt care.’ In Bradshaw’s view 
[4], failures in the NHS cannot be attributed to failures in nursing care but is argu-
ably the result of the rejection by a pluralistic society of ‘Judaeo-Christian values’ that 
no longer regards such values as relevant or valuable. In their absence, a utilitarian 
model of healthcare has emerged that is ‘market-driven and bureaucratised’ and is an 
approach that has overtaken the value of care [4]. Following an economic downturn 
in the 1970s ideas from economics started to have an impact on medicine. Economists 
such as Alan Maynard advanced a utilitarian argument that criticised healthcare 
delivery in the UK as an inefficient use of resources, claiming it was unethical 
because it deprived other patients of services [5].
According to Bradshaw [4] ‘Judaeo-Christian virtues, such as compassion, […] used 
to play a significant, though often unstated part in medicine and nursing in the west-
ern world’ but this moral framework came to be rejected by nursing leaders who ‘were 
anxious to remove the quasi-religious base for care.’ The change first occurred in the 
USA but later began to influence UK nursing that up until the 1970s saw generations 
of student nurses trained using the classic nursing textbook written by Evelyn Pearce 
[4]. In her writings, Pearce emphasised the importance of nurses developing ‘a moral 
character’ and the need to exercise ‘kindness, compassion and unselfishness which 
contact with sick people demands.’ [3] As a result of these changes, UK nurses entering 
training with a presumption of a moral framework akin to that emphasised by Pearce 
‘underwent a professional socialisation and doctrinal conversion that repudiated such 
values.’ [4] Instead, nursing began to be influenced by contemporary views of care 
emerging from the USA that included the works of Carole Gilligan and Nell Noddings. 
Both these writers espoused a view of feminine morality that countered the Kantian 
view of rights and justice, and resisted the ethics of care being formalised into abstract 
principles [6]. In the case of Noddings, she regarded the moral impetus to care as:
‘An engrossed subjective experience and not a moral norm. It is neither generaliz-
able nor universalizable and depends on an affirmative response in the cared-for. 
From this perspective, “compassion” is an emotional response dependent on recipro-
cation, and not a virtue to be cultivated as an aspect of individual character.’ [4].
For Bradshaw [4] writings on the ‘feminine ethic of care’ is problematic as it 
provides no ‘moral basis for the nurse to help the unresponsive, indifferent or even 
hostile and unsympathetic stranger. Not normative, and derived from the feminine 
nature, it is problematic for the male nurse too.’ Anca Gheaus [6] agrees and argues 
the ethics of care is not a women’s morality but a universal morality and ‘the ability 
to care well are things in which women and men can (and should) be socialised’ 
and if conceived as an exclusively feminine morality, will only lead to ‘exclusion, 
oppression and neglect.’ Other criticisms by feminist writers against feminist moral 
reasoning in terms of care have also been raised. A typical worry about such an 
ethics of care is noted by Claudia Card:
‘Resting all of ethics on caring threatens to exclude as ethically insignificant our 
relationships with most people in the world because we do not know them, and we 
never will. Regarding as ethically insignificant our relationships with people remote 
from us is a major constituent of racism and xenophobia.’ [7].
In this work I intend to explore these two views in the context of healthcare. In 
doing so, I hope to signpost a way though these opposing views; that is, between 
3
Compassion Versus Care in Healthcare Institutions: What’s the Difference?
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.97860
the view that moral emotions such as compassion are necessary for delivering good 
healthcare and those who oppose such views and argue compassion is irrelevant 
in healthcare settings because ‘it is an engrossed, subjective experience.’ To do so, I 
explore the concepts of compassion and care and rely on the work of Anca Gheaus 
[6] who argues that there is a distinction to be made between other regarding 
virtues such as compassion and that of care. In the work I also refer to the parable 
of the Good Samaritan and argue that the respective roles played by two of the key 
characters, the Samaritan and the innkeeper, are a good example of this distinction.
Today, compassion is included as one of six values in the NHS Constitution [8] 
and is frequently invoked as a means for ensuring good patient care. Despite its 
inclusion, it is a concept that is contested by a number of writers who argue such 
moral emotions are not only unnecessary but dangerous [3]. In the literature, care 
has defined in general terms as a disposition and activity of meeting needs [9] but 
according to Gheaus, although care is similar to other moral emotions such as com-
passion, it is a more intense and engaged activity [6]. Recounting the parable of the 
Good Samaritan - considered to be the prototype of the British welfare state - the 
paper reflects upon the respective roles played by the Samaritan and the innkeeper 
in the parable as a means to illuminating the difference between these two concepts. 
The paper proposes that the concept of care might be a more useful means of 
safeguarding good patient care because it involves the desire to actively help when 
possible whereas compassion is more of an attitude one may have towards people in 
general. The argument developed here references the findings of the Francis Report 
[1] and the failures in care identified at Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust. 
Obstacles to providing good care are discussed in the final sections of the paper.
2. My brother’s keeper
In the 1970s the British Secretary of State for Health, Barbara Castle, stated that 
the NHS ‘is the nearest thing to the embodiment of the Good Samaritan that we have 
in any aspect of our public policy.’ [10] In 1970 Richard Titmuss published his study 
of British blood donors, The Gift Relationship and in it he describes how the universal 
impulse to help strangers was simply enacting a fundamental truth of human exis-
tence and ‘to love oneself, one must love strangers.’ [11] In Bradshaw’s view [4] this 
specific understanding of care in nursing differs from contemporary understandings 
and in ‘a modern supposedly secular and plural society’ it is disingenuous to claim its 
values and says there is a need to acknowledge that new models of care have different 
underpinning values. The NHS Constitution currently emphasises six values that 
staff are expected to demonstrate as part of their work including: ‘Working together 
for patients; compassion; respect and dignity; improving lives; commitment to 
quality of care; everyone counts.’ [8] According to the Constitution, compassion is 
central to the care provided in the NHS and is achieved by:
‘Respond[ing] with humanity and kindness to each person’s pain, distress, anxiety 
or need. We search for the things we can do, however small, to give comfort and 
relieve suffering. We find time for patients, their families and carers, as well as 
those we work alongside. We do not wait to be asked, because we care.’ [8].
Historically, the development of the compassionate character provided the 
nursing profession with its ethos until its rejection in the 1970s. Up until then, nurse 
training involved becoming kind and compassionate, as well as becoming techni-
cally competent with ‘the character of the nurse considered just as important as 
the knowledge she possesses.’ [4] But with the traditional system of nurse training 
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considered no longer acceptable, nursing leaders set the profession on ‘an entirely 
new course.’ [12] In 1986 the UK Central Council for Nursing, Midwifery and Health 
Visiting (UKCC) published proposals that saw the implementation of Project 2000 
and the traditional apprenticeship style of nurse training giving way to a model 
that saw nurses acquire student status. With these changes, concerns were raised 
that nursing had become too academic and had ‘ditched its core vocation to care.’ 
Nurses it was claimed, had become ‘too posh to wash’ and the bedpan - ‘the enduring 
symbol’ of traditional nursing was now being emptied by someone else [12].
In Bradshaw’s view [4] the term ‘care in nursing’ has traditionally been understood 
as an axiom and is a normative moral practice of compassionate help for the stranger 
in need. Bradshaw believes this is the understanding the UK government, the Royal 
College of Nursing and the NHS Confederation appear to presuppose in their discus-
sion of the subject and is a view underpinned by the parable of the Good Samaritan 
that has its origins in the Old Testament. In the ancient Book of Leviticus, Israelites are 
commanded to welcome strangers and told to: ‘treat resident aliens as though they 
were native born and love them as yourself.’ [13] In the New Testament the parable 
of the Good Samaritan also recalls this command. It recounts the story of a travel-
ler attacked by bandits and left to die on the roadside and the response of the four 
characters who encounter the victim including the Samaritan (despised by the Jewish 
people), the priest (a privileged member of Jewish society), the Levite (a lawyer, 
inferior to the priest but still belonging to a privileged group in Jewish society) and 
the innkeeper (despised by Jews and Samaritans alike.) [10] Drawing on religious and 
racial tensions common among Jews and Samaritans at that time, the story tells of how 
two esteemed pillars of Jewish society (the priest and the Levite) refuse to help the 
victim as he lay gravely injured by the roadside because of fear of attack and also fear 
of being defiled through touching the victim. Instead, it is the Samaritan who comes to 
the victim’s aid and as he dresses the victim’s wounds, flouts laws about ritual impurity 
common among both Jews and Samaritans. During the course of the story, listen-
ers are also told that the Samaritan was a seller of oil and wine, an occupation both 
Jews and Samaritans despised, as such traders were considered ‘very shady people, 
indeed, even criminals.’ [10] Because of this listeners would have been surprised at 
the Samaritan’s actions and of his ‘willingness to go to the margins of society in his 
ministry of healing [that] defined the depth of his compassion.’ [10] The role played 
by the fourth character, the innkeeper, (a class of people generally considered to be 
thieves and robbers) adds a further unexpected twist to the story as Arbuckle explains:
‘The inn in the story was a den of thieves, and the head thief was the innkeeper, 
yet he was prepared to help the victim, for a price […] Knowing what to expect 
from the innkeeper, the Samaritan simply bribed him in order to guarantee that 
the patient would be looked after and kept alive. He left the innkeeper a certain 
amount but promised more when he returned.’ [10].
According to Arbuckle the Samaritan was a ‘shrewd businessman’ and as well as 
having the material goods to help the victim, he also had the relevant management 
skills as was evident in his dealings with the innkeeper. Alert to the weaknesses of 
human nature, the Samaritan bribed the innkeeper so he would care for the victim 
and is an example says Arbuckle, of the values of efficiency and excellence. For 
Arbuckle, there is a convergence between the values inherent in the Good Samaritan 
parable and the founding values of the welfare state in Britain and he identifies two 
kinds of values (final and instrumental) that are relevant to both:
‘Final, that is, meaning a desired end state, and […] instrumental, that is, those 
actions that are adequate or essential to achieve the desired end.’ [10].
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3. Reasoning from love to the moral inclusion of strangers
In examining the relationship between compassion and care Bradshaw [4] sug-
gests the word compassion is associated with religious belief, especially Christianity 
and that caring as an activity requires ‘cultivating the virtue of compassion in the 
carer’ that in the context of nursing, is acquired through training. On this view, com-
passion is understood as suffering together with another and is more than an emo-
tion or feeling but a whole praxis that has ‘a moral and intellectual component that is 
universalisable.’ [4] For Bradshaw, compassion is not an abstract theoretical idea but 
is lived out in the practice of the carer - a view also held by Florence Nightingale.
But in the context of healthcare, Anna Smajdor [3] argues that such moral emo-
tions are not only unnecessary but also dangerous because our capacity to love and 
feel compassion is so circumscribed that ‘[U]nless we regard healthcare profession-
als as saints, we cannot demand that they guarantee an unlimited flow of compas-
sion for each patient’ and that:
‘Medical professionals need to protect themselves as well as performing their 
medical duties, and if we demand compassion in addition to medical expertise and 
knowledge, we are setting our healthcare professionals up for failure.’ [3].
In Smajdor’s view the terminology surrounding the word care is unhelpful 
because ‘[T]o care can be either to feel a certain way, or to carry out certain activi-
ties’ and compassionate care is only really possible when, for example, we are a 
mother caring for her child or a wife for her husband. This kind of ‘relational’ care 
ethic is all very well when we are treating loved ones but as healthcare professionals 
do not routinely treat loved ones, it is dangerous and unfair relying on compassion 
as the motivation for ensuring essential tasks are carried out.
Anca Gheaus in her work, rejects the view that the relational aspect of care is 
a barrier to the moral inclusion of strangers and argues the relational nature of 
human beings has an epistemic role to play in defining the scope of human morality 
[6, 7]. Acknowledging that allowing personal relationships and emotions to be part 
of the argument that informs morality runs the risk of treating those unrelated to 
us unfairly, Gheaus argues it can still be a source of value in determining the proper 
scope of our morality as it is:
‘Imaginable, that […] intelligible, emotional connections (which I call here 
‘love’) based on the universal need people have for each other, can do the work left 
unfinished by the argument from actual connectedness.’ [7].
Defining love as ‘personal’ and directed towards a particular individual Gheaus 
argues this type of love can form the basis of our ability to respond morally to 
strangers. It is an argument she claims that is not dissimilar to religious love for 
humanity (which is universal and impartial) as it too, has sometimes ‘been consid-
ered to facilitate an ability to see the equal worth of all human beings.’ [7] By invok-
ing people’s relationships and need for each other, Gheaus argues we can engage in 
moral reasoning because of the relational fact that we are creatures who need to love 
others and also need others’ love.’ And although we relate differently to loved ones 
compared to strangers, she argues we should be morally concerned for strangers 
because they are ‘at least potentially – somebody’s loved ones.’ [7].
In reasoning from love to morality Gheaus [7] draws on feminist ethics, includ-
ing the works of Sara Ruddick (1989) [14] and Eva Kittay (1999) [15] both of whom 
‘indicate a way of reaching universalising moral conclusions from the existence of 
particular, personal bonds of love.’ She also draws on the work of the philosopher 
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Raimond Gaita [16] and his book A Common Humanity (2000) where he invites us 
to think of how our commitments to those we love, are relevant for the obligations 
we have towards other people in general. In his work, Gaita argues that precisely 
because we are able to love some individual human beings, we are able to gain a 
full understanding of the moral value of people in general and he illustrates his 
point with the story of a nun’s visit to the wards of a psychiatric hospital where he 
worked for a period in the 1960s. In the story, Gaita describes the moral responses 
of the doctors and nurses looking after the patients as diverse, ranging from brutal 
to kind. He also tells of how despite the expression of compassion by some of the 
regular staff, it was only the visiting nun that related to the psychiatric patients as 
equals and in doing so, acknowledged their full humanity. This came as a revela-
tion to Gaita, who believed the nun’s attitude was made possible by her love for the 
patients – in this case universal, Christian or saintly love. But once revealed Gaita 
believed this love was independent of the nun’s religious background and accessible 
also to those who do not hold metaphysical beliefs.
Agreeing with Gaita that love has an epistemic role to play in our morality, 
Gheaus however considers the account of the nun’s revelatory love as problematic as 
a means to universal moral inclusion because it is potentially unsustainable. Instead, 
Gheaus argues that an example of secular love, that is personal love directed at a 
particular individual, would be more convincing because the nun’s love can best 
be understood as impartial and unconditional and therefore more sustainable as a 
general attitude than it would be coming from any of the nurses or doctors involved 
in caring for the patients. For Gheaus, it is not mere coincidence that the daily hands 
on care for the patients was done by the non-compassionate nurses, and the ongoing 
responsibility borne by the compassionate but condescending doctors while the 
nun was just a passer-by. Gheaus’ argument here is that in the context of ordinary, 
everyday challenges, striving to maintain unconditional love is difficult, if at all 
humanly possible, and impartial love, disentangled from knowledge of the par-
ticularities of the beloved, is more easily amenable to being unconditional. On this 
view, an example of ordinary, partial and therefore more fragile love would be more 
convincing for two reasons:
‘First because this is the love which most of us experience. And second, because as 
already noted, this ordinary love unlike impartial and unconditional Christian 
love is not as such a moral emotion.’ [7].
A further feature identified by Gheaus of personal, partial love that is constitu-
tive of our human morality, is that of beings ‘who need each other’, and whose 
‘moral agency is in part determined by our need to be in (loving) relationships.
In her discussion of human need, Onora O’Neill argues that utilitarian thinking 
assigns no special importance to human need and leaves vital dilemmas unclarified 
and unresolved, despite the fact that all human action is predicated on ‘a plurality 
of mutually vulnerable beings who never achieve more than limited and specific 
forms of rationality, independence and self-sufficiency.’ [17] Developing an abstract 
Kantian argument that rejects ‘principled indifference to others’ she argues for a 
theory of obligations similar to that found in Christian and other religious traditions 
and also ‘present in the idiom of much of our social life.’ [18] In contrast to a utilitar-
ian perspective that endorses the pursuit of happiness without specific concern to 
meet needs, or a human rights perspective that often fails to allocate obligations to 
help those in need, O’Neill proposes an obligations theory that is premised on not 
‘bas[ing] our lives on principles that are indifferent to, or neglectful of others.’ [18] 
On this view ‘the fact that we cannot help everyone only shows that we have no 
obligation to help everyone and not that we have no obligation to help anyone.’ [18] 
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According to O’Neill ‘ethical traditions that extol universal benevolence, love for 
all mankind, or concern for all’ are misleading because nobody can provide help or 
care for all others and therefore the rejection of indifference cannot be expressed in 
action for all others [18]. As help or care for all others is not possible, the rejection 
of indifference is demonstrated through the provision of ‘some care to sustain some 
others in some ways’ [18] that is not trivial or sporadic and sustains at least some of 
their capacities and capabilities.
Not contingent on any special relationship, these obligations are called imperfect 
obligations because concern for all is not possible and therefore selective and ‘the 
pattern and occasions of virtuous action may leave much open for judgement.’ 
[18] Regarded as a moral duty, imperfect obligations cannot be claimed as a matter 
of right and are distinct from perfect obligations which gives the right to one party 
to take legal action against a party that has failed to perform a particular duty. In 
O’Neill’s view, contemporary liberal thinking marginalises imperfect obligations 
and excludes all but justice from their ethical perspective and takes pride in being 
‘agnostic about the good of man.’ [17] If we want to establish intellectually robust 
norms in health, O’Neill suggests it would be preferable to start from a systematic 
account of obligations, rather than of rights because it makes it easier to spot 
incoherence in the system [17].
4. Compassion versus care: what’s the difference?
For Gheaus the terms love and care partially overlap. In the literature ‘care’ has 
been defined in general terms as a disposition and activity of meeting needs [9]. In 
her analysis Gheaus [6] argues that when thinking of the word care there are several 
understandings of the word in the literature including: care as a type of work, care 
that signifies a special emotional bond between persons, and care as a virtue – a 
type of moral motivation as in ‘caring about.’ Distinguishing between several pos-
sible concepts of care in the literature and their relationship to each other, Gheaus 
[6] argues the different concepts do not necessarily exclude each other but that each 
presupposes the others to some extent. Rather than attempt to reduce the various 
meanings of the word found in the literature to a single concept, Gheaus [6] argues 
for a multi-layered understanding of care and proposes that we can best understand 
care and its moral significance, by connecting it to the idea of needs. The adoption 
of a multi-layered understanding that is connected to the idea of needs, makes it 
possible in Gheaus’ view, to identify different contexts of care such as healthcare 
‘that are not based on care as an emotion close to love’ but depending on context, 
can enable us to care for distant others [without] any emotional connection towards 
those one is embracing.’ [6] In the many different senses in which the word care 
is used in the feminist literature, Gheaus argues the concept of need is a common 
feature and that:
‘The most widespread way of understanding care is responsiveness to the needs of 
concrete individuals. The moral value of care is intimately linked to the fact that 
human beings are most of the time not self-sufficient, invulnerable creatures, but 
beings who depend on others for survival and thriving.’ [6].
For Gheaus meeting the needs of others necessitates individuals being treated 
in a personal way and this requires an interest in, and knowledge of, the particular 
circumstances of each person.
In the literature discussions about care have mainly been associated with 
compassion and benevolence. While noting how similar care is to other moral 
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emotions, authors have rarely provided an exact analysis of how they differ and 
according to Gheaus [6] this has precluded a full understanding of the distinctive-
ness of care. In attempting to delineate the boundaries between care and other 
moral emotions, Gheaus [6] argues that the particular meaning one attaches to the 
word means it can also come close to other moral emotions such as benevolence, 
compassion, empathy but that the scope of care is wider and involves acting on 
behalf of others. For Gheaus care is distinct from compassion or pity because 
one can be compassionate towards everybody but to qualify as care, the desire to 
actively help must also be present:
‘Compared with pity, compassion or charity, the scope of care is wider. Both pity 
and compassion are mainly about concern with people’s suffering and desire that 
it should be alleviated. But […] alleviating harm is only part of the work of care. 
Care is as much concerned with fostering growth and happiness; it is as appropriate 
a reaction to cheerful situations as to distressful ones. An additional point is that 
one may be called compassionate or feel pity without necessarily getting too actively 
involved with the suffering. By contrast, to care for someone who suffers (or rejoices) 
requires a higher degree of commitment than that of compassion. To qualify as 
“care”, an attitude must involve at least the desire to actively help when possible.’ [6].
Distinguishing care from altruistic motives that typically targets strangers, she 
develops the argument further by taking the example of benevolence:
‘One can be truly benevolent without being committed to act extensively on behalf 
of those who are the objects of benevolence. Even more important, benevolence is 
a much less partial disposition than care. One can perhaps be benevolent towards 
everybody or at least towards everybody one interacts with […] but care is more 
intense and engaged [and] our capacity to give it is limited to fewer people.’ [6].
In Arbuckles [10] analysis of the Good Samaritan parable, the distinction 
between the two concepts can be readily identified. Motivated by compassion for 
the victim, the Samaritan assists him at the roadside but is unable to commit to 
looking after the victim’s long-term needs because of business commitments: unable 
to stay and provide the necessary care, he uses the resources at his disposal (money) 
to pay someone else to do the caring. That ‘someone else’ was the innkeeper who 
agreed to actively help the victim for money and in return, was rewarded for his 
efforts with the promise of further payment on the Samaritan’s return.
In thinking of the relevance of the Good Samaritan parable to contemporary 
healthcare, the role of abstraction is important for without abstraction ‘there is 
no communication with those of differing cultures […] in short there is nothing 
that is universally relevant.’ [17] The move to abstraction in liberal thinking is, 
in Onora O’Neill’s view, a result of the absence of homogeneous community and 
culture. Abstraction has been criticised for several reasons, including the view 
that it idealises human agency and assumes ‘various superhuman capacities such 
as complete transitively ordered preferences, complete knowledge of the options 
available and their outcomes, and unwavering powers of calculation.’ [17] 
Other criticisms of abstraction are that it omits important or material aspects 
of the matter at hand. But in advancing an abstract Kantian argument that 
rejects ‘principled indifference to others’ O’Neill argues for a ‘realistic account 
of circumstances’ and says defenders of abstract rights ‘have to say something 
about the way in which obligations […] should be allocated to individuals, office 
holders and institutions.’ [17] According to O’Neill a right to healthcare requires 
counterpart duties that must be carried out by specified persons or institutions 
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that have the relevant competency and capabilities to carry out those duties [17]. 
Alongside the right to healthcare, individuals and institutions can have obliga-
tions but fulfilling or discharging those obligations, necessitates individuals and 
institutions having adequate capabilities [17].
5. Caring relationships versus institutional care
In Gheaus’ view the difference between care as work and care as relationship is 
mainly one of focus and if we introduce a strong emotional link as the basis of care 
‘we are no longer able to account for some paradigmatic cases of care-giving.’ [6] 
Rather than looking at all types of caring to see what common skills they involve, 
Gheaus [6] suggests proceeding the other way round and defining the activity of 
caring ‘via the disposition of care and its employment.’ Advocating for a multi-
layered understanding of care, Gheaus [6] suggests that in thinking of care work 
within the family or within institutions, it is not necessary to say that one type of 
care is more valuable than another as it is reasonable to think ‘that people need 
various types of caring relationships during life.’ Institutional care may be valuable 
in itself if it is a complement to the loving care one gets in intimate relationships 
and the caregivers are enabled to meet the needs well. On this view, care received 
in institutions should not be seen as a replacement to intimate relationships but as 
complementary and valuable in their own right:
‘As long as it is done well, we will definitely want to call their work “care” and 
there is no contradiction in doing so, since the criterion for judging institutions need 
not be identical to those for judging people.’ [6].
Clarifying the relationship between care directed towards a particular individual 
involved in a personal relationship and institutional care, Gheaus argues that when 
the work of caring for someone is not directly motivated by the personal concern 
of the care-giver, care is still the moral reason behind the respective practice (for 
example in hospitals) but the motivation may be different and that:
‘At its best, the work of care is concerned with wanting to meet someone’s needs but 
in caring for strangers, the motivations may be different, and can be about money 
or a desire to keep jobs.’ [6].
In the following paragraphs, and in Reference to the findings of the Francis 
Report, and the failings of care at Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, I hope 
to demonstrate how compassion, understood here as an attitude one may have 
towards people in general, is different to the work of care because it involves acting 
on behalf of others and is also limited to fewer people.
6.  Mid Staffordshire NHS foundation trust: the findings of the Francis 
Report
In the ethics of care, needs play a central role but arriving at a precise specifica-
tion of what counts as needs is particularly challenging when thinking of care-
giving institutions [6]. In a series of articles in The Lancet the dominance of the 
biomedical model was identified as one of the major obstacles to giving the ‘right 
care’ to patients in acute hospitals [19]. Medics are educated according to the prin-
ciples of biomedicine and value acute diseases offering the prospect of successful 
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treatment with medical specialities demonstrating the shortest length of stay hav-
ing the greatest prestige. But a growing ageing population, presenting with complex 
medical needs, means that older people are the major users of hospital services 
and often accused of ‘bed blocking.’ This is a term mainly used in cases where older 
people are deemed to be ‘medically fit’ but waiting for home care or alternative 
accommodation in a residential or nursing home setting. Nurses occupy a liminal 
professional space within traditional, biomedical institutions (especially hospitals) 
and for some, the emphasis on caring is detrimental to the profession. Paley, for 
example, sees care being used as a paradigm to attack the medical-scientific model 
of nursing that prevents its real development [4].
To be admitted to an acute hospital bed, a patient must first be suspected of 
having an underlying medical condition requiring treatment such as heart failure, 
hip replacement, pancreatitis to name but a few. In hospital settings, diagnosis and 
treatment are normally the responsibility of the individual physician and patients 
requiring medical treatment may be prescribed a range of treatments from drug 
therapy to surgical procedure, or both. Medical treatment is increasingly premised 
on evidence-based medicine (EBM), a method that typically tests traditional 
biomedical interventions such as drugs, devices and procedures using randomised 
controlled trials (RCTs) to arrive at the soundest evidence of a treatment’s effi-
cacy. Working alongside physicians treating patients, nurses use their clinical 
expertise and monitor a patient’s progress through constant observation of vital 
signs such as blood pressure, bodily temperature, and administering medicines etc 
and assisting with basic nursing care where needed.
In the case of Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, a distressing feature of 
the poor care identified by the Public Inquiry was the ‘plight of patients calling for 
water, languishing in soiled bedding or dying neglected and confused.’ [3] In her 
evidence to the Public Inquiry, the former Chair of Mid Staffs, Toni Brisby claimed 
the hospital was no different to any other and that:
‘A reaction that I’ve had from quite a lot of people within the NHS, which is that 
actually that’s the sort of thing that goes on virtually in all hospitals, and there but 
for the grace of God go we. Now, I’m not saying that to defend poor care, […] but I 
am saying that Stafford is not a peculiar hospital.’ [1].
Concerns about nursing care highlighted by the Public Inquiry identified failures 
in clinical care such as completing charts, weighing patients, checking intravenous 
infusions, dressing wounds, and avoiding pressure sores: in several instances, 
patients were not helped to take their medication. Other failures involved those 
associated with basic nursing care including:
‘…such matters as the supply of and help with food and drink, a timely response to 
call bells and buzzers, attention to the hygiene needs of patients, and respecting the 
dignity and privacy of patients [1].
In an article responding to the findings of the Francis Report, Anna Smajdor 
dismisses the claim that a lack of compassion particularly among nursing staff is 
to blame for poor care and argues the root cause of poor care is a lack of time and a 
lack of resources in the NHS but fails to specify where the scarcity lies. On Smajdor’s 
view compassion is not necessary when caring for patients and one can:
‘[R]emove an appendix without caring about the person from whose body it is 
taken, empty a bedpan without caring about the patient who filled it, or provide 
food without caring about the person who will eat it.’ [3].
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Conflating different types of healthcare tasks (removing an appendix versus 
emptying a bedpan) and the roles performed by different healthcare professionals 
(surgeons compared to nurses or healthcare assistants) Smajdor dismisses the need 
for compassion and suggests ‘reminders, routines, and checklists,’ can do the same 
job as compassion [3].
The theory of obligations advocated by Onora O’Neill suggests that those 
who reject ‘indifference and neglect’ must meet demanding standards: ‘but what 
those standards demand is inevitably variable and selective.’ [18] In the context 
of a ward setting, patients have many different needs, including medical and 
surgical needs (requiring many years of speciality training) and needs associated 
with basic nursing care, such as wiping bottoms, emptying bedpans, chang-
ing soiled bedsheets, or dressing seeping bed sores. The tasks associated with 
these latter needs are usually performed by a nurse or healthcare assistant and 
conflating different types of healthcare needs and the roles performed by dif-
ferent healthcare professionals, fails to do justice to patient suffering and of the 
harms inflicted through neglect, that was so much a feature of Mid Staffs NHS 
Foundation Trust.
Furthermore, Smajdor’s analysis fails to recognise a key concept in healthcare 
which is the prevention of suffering and harm. The current COVID-19 pandemic 
has triggered debate about the right for all to access healthcare and the scarcity of 
resources: Mannelli [20] argues that in the present crisis ‘as in other circumstances 
in which there is a scarcity of resources, it is unfortunately not possible to avoid 
harm at all. The effort is to reduce it.’ At Mid Staffs such efforts were not always 
apparent, as patients were denied water not because water was scarce, but because 
ill and frail patients were neglected. Care work or ‘basic’ nursing as it is often 
referred to, is integral to the work of the nurse and if a nurse or health care assistant 
fails to respond to the patient who says: ‘I need the toilet now’ or: ‘I cannot hold a 
knife or fork but can chew and swallow’ then it is hard to see how the distressing 
situation of Mid Staffs can be avoided in the future.
A shift in healthcare away from one in which the doctor and patient knew each 
other, to healthcare provided in complex institutional settings, necessitated a refo-
cus on medical ethics. In an effort to avoid paternalism and to protect patients, more 
formal relationships and procedures were instigated between the two [17]. This 
was achieved partly through the mechanism of informed consent that aimed to avoid 
imposing medical treatment or action on patients without being fully informed. 
But in O’Neill’s view, there are other ethically important concerns in healthcare 
such as ‘unnecessary surgery, clinical negligence, or unwarranted risky treatment’ 
aside from informed consent and most ethical positions do not consider informed 
consent as sufficient for respecting patient autonomy:
‘Contemporary accounts of autonomy have lost touch with their Kantian origins 
in which the links between autonomy and respect for persons are well argued; most 
reduce autonomy to some form of individual independence and show little about its 
ethical importance.’ [21].
Other emerging trends in healthcare include the concept of patient-centred care 
in which the ideals of independence and self-care are promulgated. The phrase 
‘patient-centred care’ originated in the United States but has gained prominence 
in the UK [22]. Linked to the shift in healthcare from paternalism to autonomy, 
patient-centre care (or person-centred care as it is more frequently known) is 
intended to represent the shifting of power and control from the healthcare pro-
vider or practitioner, to the patient. With patient autonomy taking precedence over 
paternalism or ‘best interests’ Jonathan Evans argues that advocating independence 
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for patients who are dependent upon others for help may be worthless without the 
necessary power needed to secure the care and attention they require [23].
Up until the late 1970s, Anne Bradshaw [4] notes that nearly every survey 
into nursing care contained unsolicited comments on the kindness and helpful-
ness of nursing staff but that patient perceptions changed in the 1990s. Under 
Tony Blair’s government, attempts at measuring compassion using patient 
surveys, was proposed by then Secretary of State for Health, Alan Johnson who 
said patients had a right to be treated with ‘dignity, respect and compassion’ – a 
move that was supported by the Royal College of Nursing [4]. Dismissive of such 
moves Anne Bradshaw [4] claims it is inherently false to measure and reward 
the appearance of compassionate care (such as encouraging nurses in the art of 
smiling or the saying of warm words) for the purposes of data collection. For 
Anna Smajdor the ‘insidious’ need to measure all we touch, including compas-
sion, is part of a broader trend that is in awe of the evidence-based structure of 
our health service:
‘Some – perhaps much – of the suffering experienced by patients and health-
care professionals in today’s healthcare systems, is the result of a clash between 
incompatible values. On one side, there is a scientistic ideology which holds that 
everything which is meaningful must be measurable and controllable. On the other, 
there is the conviction that some of the most valuable things in life are intrinsically 
so; […] It is not compassion per se, that is at issue here, but a far broader and more 
insidious need to measure all we touch.’ [3].
Following concerns about variability in medical practice and rising costs, efforts 
were made to make such systems more quantifiable by introducing a range of 
initiatives including compulsory clinical audit, quality assurance (QA) and evi-
dence-based medicine (EBM.) [5, 19] The Department of Health in Britain in 1994 
embraced the notion of knowledge-based medicine and assumed that science could 
identify non-effective treatments or procedures thereby creating uniformity in the 
delivery of services to various patients [5]. This ‘scientistic ideology’ according to 
Smajdor has contributed to much of the suffering experienced by today’s patients 
and healthcare staff alike and has stifled our ability to care. But given evidence-
based medicine is primarily concerned with the effectiveness of drugs, devices 
and procedures and not tasks associated with assisting patients on and off the 
commode, or helping with food and drink, Smajdor’s claim is somewhat puzzling. 
This is particularly so as such tasks are typically exempt from the scientific impulses 
driving evidence-based medicine. And, as effectiveness and outcomes represent 
values and not scientific universals [5], outcomes that may be seen as good from 
the doctor’s perspective (the patient is medically fit to go home) are not necessarily 
good from the patient’s perspective (the medically fit patient awaiting discharge is 
left to languish in soiled bedding).
Furthermore, Smajdor’s suggestion that ‘reminders, routines, and checklists,’ 
can do the job of compassion may only further inhibit ‘human interaction and 
thinking, lead[ing] to an increasingly rationalised world.’ [24] Such tools may 
be superfluous to the basic task at hand and potentially damaging to its perfor-
mance. Plus, the utility of such tools when compared to the potent ‘reminder’ of 
a patient calling out for help, or the pungency of a bedpan that needs emptying 
remains questionable. The NHS is a much criticised and much loved organisation 
that some argue has taken the place of religion [25]. Misdiagnosing all that ails 
the NHS, coupled with gratuitous sentimentality can only prove fatal to its proper 
functioning in the long run.
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7. Care of the self
As the capacity to care and respond to an individual’s needs is one of the defining 
characteristics of being human, losing our ability to care can be harmful. Caring about 
something constitutes a need in itself as it can bring meaning into our lives because life 
perceived to be meaningless can lead to depression [6]. In the Francis Report there were 
many accounts in which healthcare professionals employed at Mid Staffs, expressed 
their distress and feelings of depression and helplessness at finding their concerns 
dismissed [3]. In looking to identify the causes of the Trust’s failings, the Public Inquiry 
investigated the effectiveness of the Trust’s whistleblowing policies that were ‘intended 
to empower employees to raise concerns.’ From its review of the Trust’s actions in 
the case of an A&E nurse, the Inquiry concluded Mid Staffs did not follow its stated 
whistleblowing policy of supporting and protecting those who raised concerns:
‘Ms Donnelly was offered no adequate support. She had to endure harassment from 
colleagues and eventually left for other employment. Clearly such treatment was 
likely to deter others from following her example and she was aware of colleagues 
on whom this had an effect.’ [1].
It was also revealed that Ms. Donnelly was failed by her professional organisa-
tion, the Royal College of Nursing (RCN). The Inquiry also noted that doctors who 
sought to raise concerns fared little better than nurses. In evidence given to the 
Inquiry by Dr. Pradip Singh, the doctor admitted he was not ‘brave enough.’ He told 
the Inquiry raising concerns would have had a detrimental effect on his health and 
he also feared losing his job: ‘I would have then ended up becoming either a stroke 
or a heart attack, and being on the road.’ [1].
One difficulty with care-giving institutions is the number of people needing care 
at any one time. This can have implications for the quality of care and can lead to the 
overburdening of care-givers. Unlike a utilitarian or Kantian perspective on morality, 
which states that one must not place the requirements of self above the requirements 
of others, the ethics of care makes allowances for the better care of the self and rec-
ognises the moral importance of ensuring one’s own needs are met [6]. This is a view 
also articulated by Mary Wollstonecraft; writing in the eighteenth century on women’s 
human rights, she advised her female readership - often deprived of opportunities for 
self-development - that their ‘first duty is to themselves as rational creatures.’ [26] In 
conversation with a former psychiatric nurse, she described how she was distressed 
at the manner in which patients were treated on the ward she worked, and explained 
she liked to treat patients in the same way she would treat a relative, or how she herself 
would like to be treated. On referral to a counsellor (provided by her employer) she 
was told it was unrealistic to expect her colleagues to care for patients in the same way 
she did, and having such expectations, would only be detrimental to her own well-
being. She has since left the profession and now does odd jobs to earn a living.
At its best, the work of care is concerned with wanting to meet someone’s 
needs and with compassion one of the six values of the NHS Constitution, staff 
are expected to demonstrate compassion and kindness as part of their work. Staff 
placed under unremitting pressure can however become estranged from each other 
and those ‘coerced by circumstances become coercers.’ [11] Michael West writing 
for the NHS Leadership Academy maintains NHS leaders need to embody the virtue 
of compassion because in an environment that is:
‘directive, controlling, punitive, threatening or uncaring, […] compassion dries up 
and […] bullying becomes dominant [27].
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And in the context of care-giving institutions, care-givers need to be able to rely 
on people and institutional structures to support them because:
‘For those invested with institutional power, though the responses will be different 
from the requirements that apply to non-institutional interaction there is no reason 
to believe that a citizen who wishes to live in a caring society would not have any 
more reason to tolerate institutional abuse than the one who wishes to live in a just 
society.’ [6].
The NHS Constitution lists compassion as one of six values that is central to the 
work of the organisation that is realised through the expression of humanity and 
kindness to both patients and fellow staff members. In their book On Kindness11, 
Phillips and Taylor write that the pleasures of kindness are fundamental to our 
sense of well-being, a view also shared by the Mental Health Foundation in the UK 
that chose kindness as its 2020 theme:
‘[kindness] Has the singular ability to unlock our shared humanity. Kindness 
strengthens relationships, develops communities and deepens solidarity. It is a 
cornerstone of our individual and collective health.’ [22].
But unkindness is now the norm in our society, according to Philips and Taylor 
and overcoming our current attitude towards kindness, requires a form of ‘ordinary, 
unsentimental kindness’ because:
‘Real kindness is not a magic trick, a conjuring away of every hateful or aggressive 
impulse in favour of a selfless dedication to others. It is an opening up to others that 
[…] enlarges us and so gratifies our profoundly social natures.’ [11].
Following Freud and Winnicott, both Phillips and Taylor argue that sentimen-
tality and nostalgia, and not hatred, are the enemies of kindness with too much 
kindness seen as a saboteur of fully formed independence. Gaita [28] agrees we 
often struggle against a disposition to sentimentality that prevents us from seeing 
things as they are, rather than as they appear:
‘When concepts such as sentimentality, pathos are causes of the false, they are 
psychological states that can cause thought to go astray more or less as tiredness, 
drunkenness, fearfulness or recklessness can.’ [28].
Seeing things as they are and not as they appear, requires a form of understand-
ing in which head and heart are inseparably combined and says Gaita ‘is neither a 
Kantian nor a Humean thought, but one which acknowledges what is important to 
both of these traditional oppositions.’ [28].
8. Conclusion
Drawing on the parable of the Good Samaritan and the work of Anca Gheaus 
and the ethics of care, this paper has explored how the concepts of compassion 
and care differ. The distinctiveness of care according to Gheaus lies in the desire to 
actively help when possible and is a more intense and engaged activity compared 
to compassion. In the parable of the Good Samaritan, the difference between 
compassion and care is best illustrated by the differing levels of involvement of 
the Samaritan who had the resources to pay someone to do the caring, and the 
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innkeeper who agreed to care for the victim in return for money. As the work of 
care is concerned with wanting to meet someone’s needs, the motives for caring may 
be different depending on context, and for those in care-giving institutions, their 
relationship with patients remains largely instrumental and can be about money 
and staying employed. In extrapolating from the parable of the Good Samaritan 
to contemporary healthcare, the paper follows O’Neill and her arguments on the 
utility of abstraction and the need to take a realistic account of circumstances.
Bureaucratisation and rationalisation have been blamed for usurping the value 
of care with the traditional approach to care as ‘my brother’s keeper’ falling apart 
in the face of such efforts. With utilitarianism now considered to be a major influ-
encer in the practice of medicine, its influence has also seeped into UK nursing. 
Unlike compassion - here understood as an attitude one may have towards people 
in general - the work of care is concerned with wanting to meet someone’s needs. 
The ethics of care is opposed to a utilitarian approach to care and argues for care 
to retain its special moral significance, a vivid sense of particular situations and 
concrete individuals is necessary.
In the context of healthcare, meeting the needs of concrete individuals, remains 
a challenge to the NHS. As care is a more intense and engaged activity according to 
the ethics of care, defining what counts as needs, and determining how such needs 
are met, particularly among patients who are most vulnerable, requires a form of 
thought in which head and heart are intertwined. The dangers to a healthcare system 
that encourages staff to rely on ‘reminders, routines and checklists’ rather than 
thinking and human interaction along with ordinary, unsentimental, everyday kind-
ness, can only give cause for concern, and may do little to avoid the harms previously 
experienced by patients and staff at the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust.
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